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BRINGING THE SCIENCE OF POLICING TO 
LIABILITY FOR THIRD-PARTY CRIME AT 
SHOPPING MALLS 
AARON D. TWERSKI* & JON M. SHANE** 
Unlike state and municipal police forces that can generally not be sued by 
victims of crime on the grounds that they provided inadequate policing, 
shopping malls are regularly the targets by crime victims in tort actions for 
failing to provide adequate security.  Courts have struggled with the question 
of how to set the standard for reasonable policing.  Most courts place heavy 
emphasis on the foreseeability by the mall management of the likelihood of 
criminal activity to take place on the grounds of the mall.  In doing so, they rely 
on the testimony of security experts who intuit as to the adequacy of the staffing. 
This Article challenges the case law on several grounds.  First, experts fail 
to utilize objective data as to the workload of security officers on the mall.  This 
Article will demonstrate that such data is available and provides an objective 
measure as to adequate staffing.  Second, foreseeability of crime is too 
uncertain a measure as to the adequacy of staffing.  The question of how much 
foreseeability is sufficient to trigger a duty of security has bedeviled the courts.  
Third, courts have struggled to determine whether better security would have 
avoided harm to a particular crime victim.  Thus, even if security is found to be 
inadequate it is often impossible for plaintiffs to prove causation.  This Article 
argues that once a court, based on objective data, sets the standard of 
reasonable care, the burden of proof that additional security would not have 
averted the crime to the victim should shift to the defendant management of the 
mall.   
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I. INTRODUCTION 
Shopping malls and other public areas not policed by government occupy 
a unique position with regard to policing against crime.1  Unlike the streets, 
highways, and public thoroughfares that are policed by municipalities, counties, 
or state agencies, general shopping malls are not under the aegis of public 
authorities.2  Instead they are treated as purely private property with 
responsibility for security against the commission of crime totally in the hands 
of the management of the malls.3  The enormity of this undertaking can be 
 
1. Though some shopping malls are in decline as a result of on-line shopping, other malls 
continue to be profitable.  See Ben Eisen, Retailer Woes Depress Mall REITS, WALL ST. J., Mar. 27, 
2017, at B10.  However, malls that have lost their major tenants are now being redesigned to serve 
multiple purposes such as schools, senior citizen homes, fitness centers, and micro-lofts.  See, e.g., 
Kim Peterson, 10 New Uses for Abandoned Malls, MONEY WATCH (Nov. 13, 2014), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/media/10-new-uses-for-abandoned-malls/ [https://perma.cc/J8SX-M5B5]; 
Amanda Erickson, 7 Uses for Failing Shopping Malls, CITY LAB (Jan. 8, 2013), 
http://www.citylab.com/work/2013/01/7-alternatives-failing-shopping-malls/4335 
[https://perma.cc/F5RQ-2SEM]; see also Esther Fung, New Way to Fill Malls: Medical Centers, WALL 
ST. J., June 19, 2017, at A3; Esther Fung, Mall of Future Will Have No Stores, WALL ST. J., June 13, 
2017, at B6.  The management of these redesigned malls will still have to grapple with the issue of 
adequate security.  Furthermore, the workload model set forth in this Article will apply to sports arenas, 
parking lots that serve multiple car rental establishments, and other similar areas where management 
is responsible for security rather than state or municipal police forces.   
2. See, e.g., STEVEN W. MCNALLY, EXPLORING STRIP MALL CRIME PREVENTION THROUGH 
ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN: A QUALITATIVE SINGLE CASE STUDY 36 (2015).   
3. See DAN B. DOBBS ET AL., HORNBOOK ON TORTS 638 (2d ed. 2016) [hereinafter DOBBS ON 
TORTS]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 344 cmt. f (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  The site, design and 
type of each shopping center generally inform whether security is provided by the mall or through 
public police and how much security is needed.  For example, the vast majority of strip malls in the 
United States do not provide security, relying instead on public police, but regional and super-regional 
malls either have internal security personnel or contract with outside vendors for security.  Telephone 
Interview with Malachy Kavanagh, Senior Vice President, ICSC (Feb. 10, 2017); see also Ellen 
Romano, Making Shopping Centers Safer, 59 J. PROP. MGMT. 46, 49 (1994) (discussing environmental 
changes).  In either case, security extends to the common areas of the malls—parking lots, parking 
garages, ingress and egress areas, stairwells and interconnected corridors—but ends at the lease line, 
where the tenant begins.  Id. at 47.  The malls do not provide security for the interior space of individual 
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understood by observing the huge size of the malls and the number of visitors 
to malls.  The average size of the thirty largest malls in the United States is 2.07 
million square feet of gross leasable area (GLA).4  The average yearly 
 
retail stores; that is the responsibility of each tenant.  See, e.g., MCNALLY, supra note 2, at 87–89.  
This Article is concerned with security staffing for work emanating from common areas of malls and 
not with individual retail stores.  The methodology can be generalized to any size or type of mall to 
develop an understanding about staffing needs.   
4. Annual visitor data were obtained from research conducted by Travel and Leisure.  See Joe 
Yogerst, America’s Most-Visited Shopping Malls, TRAVEL & LEISURE (Dec. 2, 2011), 
http://www.travelandleisure.com/slideshows/americas-most-visited-shopping-malls 
[https://perma.cc/424U-7HHQ].  Data on annual visitors are not collected by Shoppertrak, the 
International Council of Shopping Centers, or the Directory of Major Malls, which are the mall 
industry’s leading advocacy and professional groups.  See id.  As a matter of proprietary interest, most 
malls either do not capture or do not publish data on annual visitors.  See id.  As such, all data on 
visitors are estimates.  Id.  Given that the data are used for a simulated exercise, estimates are suitable.   
 
TABLE 1: DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS IN THE STUDY (N=30) 
Variables n % Mean S.D. 
Gross Leasable Area 
(GLA) 30 —- 2,070,000.0 564,196.1 
Daily Visitors 30 —- 56,843.6 21,047.9 
Years Operating 30 —- 39.4 13.6 
Overall Attendance 30 100.0 19,270,000.0 7,135,252.5 
Before 1971 15 50.0 16,913,333.3 5,925,232.6 
After 1971 15 50.0 21,626,666.7 7,645,303.6 
Attendance by State 30 100.0 —- —- 
NY Northeast 5 16.7 20,800,000.0 2,280,350.9 
CA West 3 10.0 21,866,666.7 5,801,149.3 
FL South 3 10.0 21,666,666.7 9,291,573.2 
IL Midwest 3 10.0 2,000,000.0 8,888,194.4 
TX South 3 10.0 20,333,333.3 4,041,451.9 
NJ Northeast 2 6.7 15,900,000.0 5,798,275.6 
AZ West 1 3.3 12,200,000.0 —- 
GA South 1 3.3 1,500,000.0 —- 
MA Northeast 1 3.3 1,700,000.0 —- 
MI Midwest 1 3.3 8,400,000.0 —- 
MN Midwest 1 3.3 40,000,000.0 —- 
NC South 1 3.3 20,000,000.0 —- 
NV West 1 3.3 1,300,000.0 —- 
OH Midwest 1 3.3 810,000.0 —- 
PA Northeast 1 3.3 25,000,000.0 —- 
VA South 1 3.3 22,100,000.0 —- 
WA West 1 3.3 9,900,000.0 —- 
Attendance by Region 30 100.0 —- —- 
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attendance per mall is 19.27 million visitors.5  Based on being open for business 
an average of 6.5 days per week, each year average daily attendance is 56,844.6  
Suffice it to say that the amount of daily human traffic in a large shopping mall 
is enormous—equal to that of many fairly large American cities.7   
Comparing large shopping mall traffic with cities of like population would 
be of little interest were it not for a vast difference in the law governing liability 
to individuals who claim to have suffered personal injury as a result of 
inadequate policing.  With very limited exceptions, government entities are not 
held liable to individuals against claims that the entity has not provided 
adequate resources to prevent crime.8  Courts have found no tort duty running 
to an individual.9  The very opposite is true with regard to shopping malls.10  A 
multitude of claimants have sued in tort for the negligence of the management 
of shopping malls for crimes perpetrated against individuals on their premises 
based on the grounds that management failed to provide adequate security.11  
 
Northeast 9 30.0 19,755,555.6 3,948,136.0 
South 9 30.0 20,344,444.4 5,503,887.5 
Midwest 6 20.0 19,416,666.7 12,900,607.2 
West 6 20.0 16,783,333.3 6,745,788.8 
 
5. See id.   
6. See id.   
7. For example, according to the 2015 Census Bureau estimate, Jupiter, Florida, had a population 
of 62,748.  American FactFinder, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://factfinder.census.gov 
[https://perma.cc/Q4VP-UUR8] (last visited July 13, 2017).  The 2016 estimates for La Mesa, 
California, are 59,948.  Id.  The comparison between cities and shopping malls is not directly 
analogous; however, shopping malls do compare well with cities in terms of calls for service, crime, 
staffing issues and security needs.  The size of the mall (density) and the amount of time someone 
spends at the mall compared to a city create measurement issues.  Nonetheless, the presence of over 
56,000 people at a mall over a given day presents policing challenges similar to cities.   
8. See DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 574; Licia A. Esposito Eaton, Annotation, Liability of 
Municipality or Other Governmental Unit for Failure to Provide Police Protection From Crime, 90 
A.L.R. 5th 273 (2001); see, e.g., Taylor v. Phelan, 9 F.3d 882, 887–88 (10th Cir. 1993) (applying 
Kansas Law); Mastbergen v. City of Sheldon, 515 N.W.2d 3, 5 (Iowa 1994); Riss v. City of New York, 
240 N.E.2d 861 (N.Y. 1968).   
9. Taylor, 9 F.3d at 887–88; Riss, 240 N.E.2d at 860–61.   
10. L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W.3d 247, 262 (Mo. 2002) (en banc); 
Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36, 38, 40–41 (N.C. 1981).   
11. See, e.g., Young v. Prizm Asset Mgmt. Co., 100 A.3d 594 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014); Fenelon v. 
Jackson Metrocenter Mall Ltd., 11-CA-00683-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) (en banc); Trammell Crow 
Cent. Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. 2008); American Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Hogue, 1998-CA-
01273-COA (Miss. Ct. App. 2000); L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d 247; Staples v. CBL & Assocs., Inc., 15 S.W.3d 
83 (Tenn. 2000); Knauss v. DND Neffson Co., 963 P.2d 271 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1997); McClung v. Delta 
Square Ltd. P’ship, 937 S.W.2d 891 (Tenn. 1996); Ann M. v. Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207 
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Thus, the question of how much security is enough security to protect a mall 
against personal injury claims based on negligence is a question of great 
moment.  We do not mean to say that the question of adequate policing for 
municipal and state agencies is unimportant.  A vast literature has sought to 
grapple with that issue.12  At bottom, however, the resolution of that issue is 
political.  What resources are to be directed to police, firefighters, schools and 
infrastructure are simply not justiciable by common law courts.13  For shopping 
malls there is no escape from the question of the adequacy of security.   
This Article will examine the law governing the liability of shopping malls 
for negligence based on inadequate staffing.  Part II will examine the four tests 
utilized by courts to decide liability for torts against individuals and will find 
them all seriously flawed.  Part III will assume that negligence can be 
established, but will focus on the requirement that a plaintiff establish that the 
failure to provide adequate security was a cause-in-fact of her injury.  Part IV 
will demonstrate that the issue of how much security is adequate is subject to 
objective quantification that is data-driven.  Part V will argue that a plaintiff 
who proves that based on objective data the mall has not provided adequate 
security should not be required to prove a causal nexus between the inadequacy 
 
(Cal. 1993); Federated Dep’t Stores, Inc. v. Doe, 454 So. 2d 10 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984); Miles v. 
Flor-Line Assocs., 442 So. 2d 584 (La. Ct. App. 1983); Foster, 281 S.E.2d 36.   
12. See, e.g., CHARLES D. HALE, POLICE PATROL: OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT (2d ed. 
1994); JON M. SHANE, WHAT EVERY CHIEF EXECUTIVE SHOULD KNOW: USING DATA TO MEASURE 
POLICE PERFORMANCE (2007); THE TRAFFIC INSTITUTE, NW. U., POLICE ALLOCATION MANUAL: 
DETERMINATION OF THE NUMBER AND ALLOCATION OF PERSONNEL FOR PATROL SERVICES FOR 
STATE POLICE DEPARTMENTS (1993), https://rosap.ntl.bts.gov/view/dot/12763 
[https://perma.cc/5E76-YRSG]; Lawrence W. Sherman & David Weisburd, General Deterrent Effects 
of Police Patrol in Crime “Hot Spots”: A Randomized, Controlled Trial, 12 JUST. Q. 625 (1995); 
Jeremy M. Wilson & Alexander Weiss, A Performance-Based Approach to Police Staffing and 
Allocation, in ESSENTIALS FOR LEADERS (2012).   
13. See, e.g., Riss, 240 N.E.2d at 860–61.  For example, in Riss v. City of New York, the court 
said:  
The amount of [police] protection that may be provided is limited by the resources 
of the community and by a considered legislative-executive decision as to how 
those resources may be deployed.  For the courts to proclaim a new and general 
duty of protection in the law of tort, even to those who may be the particular 
seekers of protection based on specific hazards, could and would inevitably 
determine how the limited police resources of the community should be allocated 
and without predictable limits.  This is quite different from the predictable 
allocation of resources and liabilities when public hospitals, rapid transit systems, 
or even highways are provided.   
Before such extension of responsibilities should be dictated by the indirect 
imposition of tort liabilities, there should be a legislative determination that that 
should be the scope of public responsibility.   
Id.  
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of the security and her individual injury.  Rather, the burden of proof should be 
on the defendant to prove that even with adequate security the plaintiff would 
have been injured.   
II. THE LIABILITY STANDARD: FOUR VERSIONS OF DUTY 
Courts traditionally begin their analysis of the duty of landowners to protect 
against third-party crime by noting that duty is an issue of law to be decided by 
the court.14  In doing so they signal that they are not prepared to simply allow 
these cases to go to juries on a common law negligence standard.15  Instead they 
seek to establish rules to screen out cases before they are permitted to go to a 
jury.16  The four approaches to the problem are:  
 
(1) Specific Imminent Harm Test.  According to this rule a 
 landowner does not owe a duty to protect patrons from the 
 violent acts of third parties unless he is aware of specific 
 imminent harm about to befall them.17   
(2) Similar Incidents Test.  In order to establish foreseeability 
 requiring a mall to take precautions against third-party 
 crime the plaintiff must establish a past history of similar 
 criminal conduct on or near the premises.18   
(3) Totality of Circumstances Test.  This test looks to a host of 
 factors such as the nature, condition and location of the 
 land, the level of crime in the surrounding area and any 
 other factors that may alert the landowner to the likelihood 
 
14. See, e.g., Trammell, 267 S.W.3d at 12; L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257; Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 89; 
Ann M., 863 P.2d at 212; Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 101 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); 
Thai v. Stang, 263 Cal. Rptr. 202, 205 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).   
15. See, e.g., Trammell, 267 S.W.3d at 12; L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257; Staples, 15 S.W.3d at 89; 
Ann M., 863 P.2d at 212; Nola M., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 101; Thai, 263 Cal. Rptr. at 205.  
16. For a summary of differing approaches, see DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 638–39. 
Posecai v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 99-1222, p. 4–8 (La. 11/30/99); 752 So. 2d 762, 766–67; McClung, 
937 S.W.2d at 899–900.  
17. Willmon v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 957 F. Supp. 1074, 1076–77 (E.D. Ark. 1997); 
MacDonald v. PKT, Inc., 628 N.W.2d 33, 34, 40 (Mich. 2001); Dudas v. Glenwood Golf Club, Inc., 
540 S.E.2d 129, 132 (Va. 2001); Burns v. Johnson, 458 S.E.2d 448, 450 (Va. 1995); Bailey v. Bruno’s 
Inc., 561 So. 2d 509, 510–11 (Ala. 1990); Naegele v. Dollen, 63 N.W.2d 165, 166–67 (Neb. 1954).   
18. Wood v. Centermark Props., Inc., 984 S.W.2d 517, 524 (Mo. Ct. App. 1998), modified, 
L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 258; Lauersdorf v. Supermarket Gen. Corp., 657 N.Y.S.2d 732, 733 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 1997); Boren v. Worthen Nat’l Bank of Ark., 921 S.W.2d 934, 940–41 (Ark. 1996).   
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 of crime.19   
(4) The Balancing Test.  This test seeks to address the interests 
 of both business proprietors and their customers by 
 balancing the foreseeability of harm against the burden of 
 imposing a duty to protect against criminal acts of third 
 persons.20   
 
The “specific imminent” harm test has been rejected by most courts as too 
restrictive in limiting the duty of business owners to their invitees.21  The 
“similar incidents test” has been criticized because of the variability of the 
number and nature of crimes necessary to trigger a duty.22  The “totality of 
circumstances” test has been shunned by some courts as being too open-ended 
and hence imposing an overbroad duty to business establishments.23  The 
“balancing test” appears not be a duty rule at all but simply an articulation of 
the Learned Hand risk/utility test for negligence.24   
Two related problems are common to each of these tests.  First, they all rely 
heavily on foreseeability of violent crime as the grounds either for imposing a 
duty to adopt security measures or for deciding whether the standard they have 
set was breached.25  However, the courts are hopelessly in disagreement as to 
 
19. Maguire v. Hilton Hotels Corp., 899 P.2d 393, 400 (Haw. 1995); Whittaker v. Saraceno, 635 
N.E.2d 1185, 1188 (Mass. 1994); Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 856 P.2d 1332, 1335 (Kan. 
1993); Reitz v. May Co. Dept. Stores, 583 N.E.2d 1071, 1074–75 (Ohio Ct. App. 1990).   
20. Various courts have adopted a balancing test that at first glance appears not to have the 
hallmarks of duty rules that set firm guidelines for liability.  Bass v. Gopal, Inc., 716 S.E.2d 910, 915 
(S.C. 2011); Posecai, 99-1222, p. 8–9; 752 So. 2d at 767–68; McClung, 937 S.W.2d at 901; Ann M., 
863 P.2d at 215.  Nonetheless, these courts signal that they will engage in rigorous risk/utility balancing 
and will not routinely allow cases to go to a jury without evidence of high foreseeability of crime.  See 
AARON D. TWERSKI ET AL., TORTS: CASES AND MATERIALS 475–76 (3d ed. 2012).   
21. Posecai, 99-C-1222, p. 6; 752 So. 2d at 767.   
22. Id. at p. 6–7; 752 So. 2d at 767.   
23. Id. at p. 7–8; 752 So. 2d at 767.   
24. It is interesting to note that the California court that first articulated the “balancing test” in 
Ann M. v. Pacific Plaza Shopping Center, concluded that it would not impose liability for failure to 
hire security guards unless there was a “high degree of foreseeability” of criminal activity on the 
premises and that degree of foreseeability “rarely, if ever, can be proven in the absence of prior similar 
incidents of violent crime on the landowner’s premises.”  863 P.2d 207, 215 (Cal. 1993).  The court 
said that “the obligation to provide patrols adequate to deter criminal conduct is not well defined.  ‘No 
one really knows why people commit crime, hence no one really knows what is “adequate” deterrence 
in any given situation.’”  Id. (quoting 7735 Hollywood Blvd. Venture v. Superior Court, 172 Cal. Rptr. 
528, 530 (Cal. Ct. App. 1981)).   
25. See, e.g., L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W.3d 247, 257–58 (Mo. 2002) 
(en banc); Dickinson Arms-REO, L.P. v. Campbell, 4 S.W.3d 333, 346 (Tex. App. 1999); Ann M., 863 
P.2d at 215.   
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how much foreseeable crime constitutes “enough foreseeability”26 to trigger a 
duty of reasonable care or breach of the duty.  Furthermore, in order to decide 
whether mall management breached the standard of reasonable care the courts 
rely on security experts to opine as to the adequacy of the security or breach 
measures taken.27  As this Article will demonstrate, foreseeability of crime 
should not be solely determinative of duty or breach of the standard of 
reasonable care.  Second, expert opinion is of little value if it does not utilize 
hard data based on the total calls for service (i.e., assignments distributed to 
security officers that require their presence to address a specific condition) that 
sets forth the workload of security officers at the mall.28  The presence and 
frequency of crime will be one of many variables that will appear in records of 
calls for service.29  Security experts that are called by the opposing parties offer 
little more than intuitive opinions as to the adequacy of security.30  We have 
seen no evidence in the judicial opinions or the expert reports that workload 
data has been referenced.  Indeed, we have examined a multitude of shopping 
mall security cases and expert opinions and have not found a single case where 
an expert has testified to workload data.31   
In the absence of hard data, the courts’ emphasis on similar incidents or 
other indicia of crime are unhelpful in deciding the adequacy of security.  
 
26. Fenelon v. Jackson Metrocenter Mall Ltd., 11-CA-00683-COA (¶ 18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012) 
(en banc) (stating plaintiff’s argument that an “atmosphere of violence” was sufficient to create duty 
of reasonable care); Trammell Crow Cent. Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 S.W.3d 9, 18 (Tex. 2008) 
(Jefferson, J., concurring); Liller v. Quick Stop Food Mart, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 602, 605 (N.C. Ct. App. 
1998) (noting case law discussing how many crimes are sufficient to trigger a duty of reasonable care); 
McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P’ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 899 (Tenn. 1996) (“[C]ourts do not universally 
agree on the meaning of ‘foreseeability.’”).   
27. See, e.g., Fenelon, 11-CA-00683-COA (¶ 7).   
28. See Wright v. R.M. Smith Invs., L.P., 15-CA-00199-COA (¶¶ 8, 9, 11) (Miss. Ct. App. 
2016).   
29. Jon M. Shane, Activity-Based Budgeting: Creating a Nexus Between Workload and Costs, 
74 FBI L. ENFORCEMENT BULL. 11, 15 (2005).   
30. See Wright, 15-CA-00199-COA (¶¶ 8, 11).   
31. See id.  Because judicial decisions do not reflect workload data in deciding whether a mall 
acted reasonably to secure the premises from third party criminal acts, we sought out expert reports 
and affidavits to see whether expert reports made reference to workload data.  After studying the 
reports, we found not a single expert report that made reference to such data.  We located these 
documents by searching the Westlaw Database: Expert Reports and Affidavits, using the following 
query: “Security/p park! or shop! And mall or center or retail and “premise! Liability.”  The search 
retrieved 386 results, which were filtered to display only those reports and affidavits from Law 
Enforcement & Private Security Experts.  The final result list contained 96 documents.  The search 
was last run on March 2, 2017, to determine whether the experts in their opinions utilized such data.  
Experts that do not rely on workload data, or cannot articulate the methods or standards they relied 
upon to arrive at their decision may be barred in some jurisdictions from testifying at trial.  Id.   
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Security officers deal not only with violent crime such as robbery, carjacking 
and rape, but also a host of other activities in a mall such as auto accidents, 
noise complaints, unruly juveniles, disorderly conduct, etc.32  Security officers 
whose attention is diverted to a myriad of non-violent activities are not present 
to adequately patrol and deter violent crime.  Thus any test that a court adopts 
to establish a duty to police against crime will fail unless the totality of service 
calls for a mall is established.  Admittedly, deployment of security forces, the 
adequacy of their training, and whether they have adequate equipment will 
factor into whether the mall’s security was reasonable, but the starting point has 
to be adequacy of staffing.  In the ensuing sections, we shall demonstrate that 
such hard data on staffing is available but has never been used in shopping mall 
injury cases.33   
III. THE ILLUSIVE ISSUE OF ACTUAL OR BUT-FOR CAUSATION 
Even where courts are able to make a finding of inadequate security, 
plaintiffs are faced with an impossible causation burden to overcome.  To make 
out but-for causation, plaintiffs must establish that, had there been adequate 
security, the crime would not have transpired.34  For reasons that will be 
developed, plaintiffs either cannot meet the burden35 or the courts send the issue 
to juries for resolution knowing that they can do nothing but speculate as to 
whether causation has been established.36   
For better or worse, the “but-for” test for causation is the overwhelming 
majority rule as an essential element in making out a prima facie case of 
negligence,37 and it has been formally recognized in the Third Restatement of 
Torts.38  Though courts allow juries considerable latitude in deciding but-for 
 
32. See infra Part IV.   
33. See infra Part IV. 
34. Fenelon v. Jackson Metrocenter Mall Ltd., 11-CA-00683-COA (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012); 
Liller v. Quick Stop Food Mart, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 602, 606 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).   
35. See, e.g., Fenelon, 11-CA-00683-COA (¶¶18, 24, 25) (Irving, J., dissenting); Saelzler v. 
Advanced Grp. 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1152 (Cal. 2001); Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 
785, 791 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Liller, 507 S.E. 2d at 606.   
36.  See Stewart v. Federated Dept. Stores, Inc., 662 A.2d 753, 759 (Conn. 1995) (approving 
general charge on causation without explicit reference to cause-in-fact).   
37. DOBBS ON TORTS, supra note 3, at 317.   
38. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 26 (AM. LAW INST. 2010).   
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causation39 there are limitations.40  Pure speculation on causation is beyond the 
pale.  In landowner security cases, many courts have justifiably granted 
defendants summary judgment or directed verdicts because the evidence on 
causation was too thin.41  One might draw an analogy to the heeding 
presumption that has been adopted by many courts in products liability failure 
to warn cases42 to aid the plaintiff in mall security cases to establish causation.  
When a plaintiff establishes that a product was sold with inadequate warnings 
and that she suffered an injury that could have been averted had the warning 
been given, the question arises whether plaintiff would have read or heeded the 
warning had it been given.43  Courts are keenly aware that placing the burden 
on the plaintiff may often result in no recovery.44  To aid the plaintiff in 
 
39. See, e.g., Zuchowicz v. United States, 140 F.3d 381, 389–90 (2d Cir. 1998); Reynolds v. 
Tex. & Pac. Ry. Co., 37 La. Ann. 694 (La. 1885).  The classic article on this topic is Wex S. Malone, 
Ruminations on Cause-in-Fact, 9 STAN. L. REV. 60 (1956); see also PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE 
LAW OF TORTS 270 (W. Page Keeton et al. eds., 5th ed. 1984).   
40. See, e.g., Williams v. Utica Coll. of Syracuse Univ., 453 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2006); 
Perkins v. Tex. & New Orleans R.R. Co., 147 So. 2d 646 (La. 1962).   
41. See, e.g., Tucker v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 689 F. Supp. 560 (D. Md. 1988); Fenelon v. 
Jackson Metrocenter Mall Ltd., 11-CA-00683-COA (¶18) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012); Burris v. Eddie’s 
Liquor Store, No. B153671, 2002 WL 31521538 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 14, 2002); Saelzler v. Advanced 
Grp. 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1155 (Cal. 2001); Liller v. Quick Stop Food Mart, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 602 (N.C. 
Ct. App. 1998); Leslie G. v. Perry & Assocs., 50 Cal. Rptr. 2d 785 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996); Nola M. v. 
Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Thai v. Stang, 263 Cal. Rptr. 202 (Cal. Ct. 
App. 1989); Noble v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).   
42. See Tech. Chem. Co. v. Jacobs, 480 S.W.2d 602, 606 (Tex. 1972).   
43. See, e.g., id.  The earliest case confronting this issue was Technical Chemical Company v. 
Jacobs, where the court said: 
It has been suggested that the law should supply the presumption that an adequate 
warning would have been read.  “Where warning is given, the seller may 
reasonably assume that it will be read and heeded.”  Such a presumption works 
in favor of the manufacturer when an adequate warning is present.  Where there 
is no warning, as in this case, however, the presumption that the user would have 
read an adequate warning works in favor of the plaintiff user.  In other words, the 
presumption is that Jacobs would have read an adequate warning. The 
presumption, may, however, be rebutted if the manufacturer comes forward with 
contrary evidence that the presumed fact did not exist.  Depending upon the 
individual facts, this may be accomplished by the manufacturer’s producing 
evidence that the user was blind, illiterate, intoxicated at the time of the use, 
irresponsible or lax in judgment or by some other circumstance tending to show 
that the improper use was or would have been made regardless of the warning.   
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A cmt. j (AM. LAW INST. 
1965)).   
44. See Pavlik v. Lane Ltd./Tobacco Exporters Int’l, 135 F.3d 876, 883 (3d Cir. 1998); Nissen 
Trampoline Co. v. Terre Haute First Nat’l Bank, 332 N.E.2d 820, 826 (Ind. Ct. App. 1975), rev’d on 
other grounds, 358 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1976); James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, Doctrinal 
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establishing a prima facie case in products liability, a substantial number of 
courts have created a rebuttable presumption that shifts the burden of 
production to the defendant that the plaintiff would not have either read or 
heeded the presumption.45  Similarly, where plaintiff has established that 
security was inadequate one might suggest that a presumption of causation 
inure to the plaintiff, thus shifting the burden of production to the defendant 
that additional security would not have averted the crime.46   
The analogy to product liability cases is not apt.  In product failure-to-warn 
cases, defendants seek to rebut the presumption by introducing evidence of the 
plaintiff’s behavior that suggests that the plaintiff would not have heeded the 
warning.47  Plaintiffs are then in a position to argue that the specific behavior is 
not indicative that they would not have heeded a warning if given.48  The issue 
is almost always one of fact subject to jury determination.49  In the mall security 
cases, defendants will routinely present some evidence suggesting that 
additional security would not have averted the particular crime.50  They will 
have done enough to meet their burden of production.  Plaintiffs, who retain the 
burden of persuasion on causation, have no way of carrying their burden.51  It 
is extremely difficult to prove that additional security guards would have 
averted a criminal attack by a third party.52   
 
Collapse in Products Liability: The Empty Shell of Failure to Warn, 65 N.Y.U. L. REV. 265, 278–79 
(1990).   
45. See, e.g., Tenbarge v. Ames Taping Tool Sys., Inc., 190 F.3d 862, 866 (8th Cir. 1999); Nissen 
Trampoline Co., 332 N.E.2d 820, 826–27, rev’d on other grounds, 358 N.E.2d 974 (Ind. 1976); Reyes 
v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264, 1281 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096 (1974); Cunningham 
v. Charles Pfizer & Co., 532 P.2d 1377, 1382 (Okla. 1974).  In 1998, the Third Circuit predicted that 
Pennsylvania would adopt a heeding presumption in failure-to-warn cases.  Pavlik, 135 F.3d at 883.  
Although Pennsylvania’s high court has not yet decided this issue, the lower courts have adopted a 
heeding presumption with increasing consistency.  See, e.g., Maya v. Johnson & Johnson, 97 A.3d 
1203, 1219 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014) (deciding that the trial court did not err in failing to instruct the jury 
on the heeding presumption in a case involving Children’s Motrin).  For an extensive discussion of the 
heeding presumption, also see Henderson & Twerski, supra note 44, at 278–80; Aaron D. Twerski & 
Neil B. Cohen, Resolving the Dilemma of Nonjusticiable Causation in Failure-to-Warn Litigation, 84 
S. CAL. L. REV. 125, 136–43 (2010).   
46. See Pavlik, 135 F.3d at 884.   
47. See, e.g., Waterhouse v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 162 F. App’x 231, 235 (4th Cir. 2006); 
Golonka v. Gen. Motors Corp., 65 P.3d 956, 966 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2003).   
48. See Bryant v. BGHA, Inc., 9 F. Supp. 3d 1374, 1395–96 (M.D. Ga. 2014).   
49. Golonka, 65 P.3d at 966.   
50. See, e.g., Liller v. Quick Stop Food Mart, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 602, 606 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998); 
Thai v. Stang, 263 Cal. Rptr. 202, 207 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).   
51. See Saelzler v. Advanced Grp. 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1153 (Cal. 2001).   
52. See id.  Some courts have switched the burden of proof on causation from the plaintiff to the 
defendant when plaintiff faces an impossible burden of proof that the defendant’s negligence was the 
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In the concluding section of this Article, we shall argue that the plaintiff not 
be burdened with proving causation, but the burden of proof on causation 
should shift to the defendant.  We will be comfortable in doing so because we 
will establish a data-driven standard for adequate security.  Unlike the current 
situation where the standard for what constitutes adequate security has no 
objective parameters, causation has to serve as a break against wholly illusory 
standards of liability.53  However, once a court can conclude with confidence 
that objective data support a finding of inadequate security, there is every 
reason to allow a plaintiff to recover without asking her to prove the impossible.  
The burden of proof should shift to the defendants to prove that even with 
adequate security the plaintiff would have suffered injury.   
IV. STAFFING MODEL FOR SHOPPING CENTER SECURITY PERSONNEL 
The need for security personnel at shopping centers is evident, but the 
provocative question is this: How many security personnel are deemed 
adequate or how much security is reasonable?  To answer this question, it is 
crucial to determine the actual and anticipated workload that shopping center 
security personnel are likely to encounter based on calls for service.  This 
requirement for the shopping center can be anticipated; it is measurable.  For 
shopping center security, as with the public policing, the demand for services 
shifts with priorities as well as the routine patterns and fluctuations of reactive 
work that presents itself through calls for service.   
A shopping center is akin to a city with all of the associated variation in 
patrons (adults, juveniles, elderly) and temporal use patterns (day and time of 
week, seasonality, holidays, special events, heavy-volume periods of vehicles 
and pedestrians).54  In their decisions, courts often speak in generalized terms 
when describing a shopping center’s level of security such as (in)adequate 
staffing, (in)adequate security, (in)adequate safety measures, (un)reasonable 
security, and (in)sufficient security.55  As noted, the parties rely on experts to 
help determine what adequate staffing levels should have been at the time of 
 
cause-in-fact of her injury.  See, e.g., Haft v. Lone Palm Hotel, 478 P.2d 465, 475 (Cal. 1970); Summers 
v. Tice, 199 P.2d 1, 4 (Cal. 1948); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS § 28(b) (AM. LAW INST. 
2010); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 433B (AM. LAW INST. 1965).  But see, David W. 
Robertson, The Common Sense of Cause in Fact, 75 TEX. L. REV. 1765, 1783 (1997) (noting that Haft 
fails to “offer much guidance as to when burden shifting is appropriate”).   
53. See Nola M. v. Univ. of S. Cal., 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 109 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); Noble v. L.A. 
Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395, 398–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).   
54. See MCNALLY, supra note 2, at 2.   
55. See Monk v. Temple George Assocs., L.L.C., 869 A.2d 179, 183, 187 (Conn. 2005); Noble, 
214 Cal. Rptr. at 398.   
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the crime.56  Experts will often review crime statistics for the area surrounding 
the mall, review the parking lot configuration, and review existing lighting, but 
these conditions do not necessarily imply the need for a specific number of 
security staff, particularly how many more personnel are needed to establish 
“adequacy.”57  Moreover, these factors are not measured against any industry 
standard that imply a need for additional security staff.58  Indeed, any standard 
appears to be the personal estimate of the individual security experts who 
inevitably disagree.59  At best, experts can only speculate about adequate 
security levels when they are not informed by data; at worst, their estimates are 
completely inaccurate about the number of personnel needed to provide 
adequate security.  While regional, corporate, and consumer preferences must 
be accounted for when determining the appropriate level of security for a given 
shopping center, there is a standardized method to establish a baseline measure 
for adequate staffing using empirical data.60   
A. Workload Data Evaluation 
Shopping center security personnel typically engage in patrol activities 
including emergency response, visitor management, patron assistance, escorts, 
bank deposits, and traffic assistance.61  One of the most consistent activities 
across different sized malls and regions is patrol and response.62  Determining 
adequate patrol and response requires that the expert evaluate the reactive 
 
56. Fenelon v. Jackson Metrocenter Mall Ltd., 11-CA-00683-COA (¶ 7) (Miss. Ct. App. 2012); 
Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 398.   
57. Monk, 869 A.2d at 183; Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 398.   
58. See generally Noble, 214 Cal. Rptr. at 397–99.   
59. Id. at 398.   
60. See generally Shane, supra note 29 (explaining the full model and technical specifications 
of how the model is conceptualized).  Based on Shane’s personal and consultative experience in 
policing since 1985 across the United States and abroad, capturing the workload data shown in Table 
2 is a fundamental aspect of police management.  See infra Table 2.  Workload analysis is so basic to 
policing that the Commission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) recognizes 
workload assessments as a standard that must be adopted for accreditation.  See COMM’N ON 
ACCREDITATION FOR LAW ENF’T AGENCIES, INC., STANDARDS FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES 
16-2 (5th ed. 2006) (“The agency allocates personnel to, and distributes them within, all organizational 
components in accordance with documented workload assessments conducted at least once every three 
years.”).  The Lee County, Florida, Sheriff’s Office has adopted Shane’s staffing model at the 
recommendation of CALEA.  Telephone Interview with Ronald Curtis, Captain, Florida Sheriff’s 
Office (Mar. 9, 2017).   
61. Romano, supra note 3, at 46–52; Margaret Hunter, Who’s Minding the Mall, 32 SEC. MGMT. 
54, 54–56 (1988).   
62. See, e.g., Romano, supra note 3, at 46–47; Hunter, supra note 61, at 54.   
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workload presented to the security department (i.e., calls for service).63  
Workload data are objective.64  They present telltale signs of problems and the 
locations where those problems are likely to emerge.65  The nexus between 
workload and cost provides mall executives and managers the ability to exercise 
control in several ways: (1) assign personnel based upon a demonstrated need; 
(2) expand or contract personnel proportionately as the need changes; (3) 
uncover waste and hidden costs; (4) view which activities are most and least 
expensive, thus subjecting them to review; (5) assess the full efficiency of the 
security program; (6) identify places to cut spending; (7) establish a cost 
baseline that may be influenced through process or technology changes that 
reduce effort requirements for the activity, and (8) argue from an informed, 
objective position in favor of the security program’s budget.66   
B. A Simulated Workload Analysis and Staffing Model for a Shopping Center  
Collecting the Data.  Security staffing based on empirical data is the most 
reasonable and easiest to justify; in fact, “[t]he only logical and defensible 
means of determining how many persons should be assigned to patrol duty is 
through a careful and systematic analysis of the duties performed by patrol 
officers.”67  The best indicator of crime and disorder conditions, as well as 
assigned duties, is analyzing actual calls for service of past demands.68  These 
calls include crimes (violent and property); public disorder (noise, fighting, 
groups congregating and loitering) and suspicious circumstances (persons, 
vehicles and items) that belie security problems; as well as service needs such 
 
63. Shane, supra note 29, at 15.   
64. Id. at 13.   
65. Generally, the focus on mall security is to assist and prevent crimes against patrons.  
However, crimes against employees provide telltale signs of a wider or emerging crime problem that 
may not yet have reached patrons.  Crimes involving employees such as assault, robbery, car theft, and 
theft from cars should be viewed as indicators of a wider or emerging crime problem that should be 
addressed.   
66. Shane, supra note 29, at 12.   
67. CHARLES D. HALE, POLICE PATROL: OPERATIONS AND MANAGEMENT 162 (1981).   
68. Richard C. Lumb, Community Attitudes Regarding Police Responsibility for Crime Control, 
69 POLICE J. 319, 319–26 (1996) (discussing staffing indicators that are derived from demands for 
service); see Shane, supra note 29, at 15 (describing the accuracy of calls for service data).  Calls for 
service data must not be confused with demographic data as a driver for security measures.  
Demographic data are variables such as age, sex, race, employment status, poverty level, income level, 
education level, and population characteristics.  These are not crime data; they are data that reflect the 
composition of the population collected by the U.S. Census Bureau.  Demographic data do not 
implicate site-specific conditions, actual crime rate or workload volume at a given property address 
and should not be relied upon to infer crime and disorder conditions.   
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as medical calls, hazardous conditions, traffic control, and patron assistance.69  
Determining adequate staffing begins with a workload analysis, which is “the 
process of collecting and analyzing data on patrol activities for the purpose of 
more efficient scheduling and deployment of manpower.”70  Calls for service 
represent the reactive portion of the workload.71  Undertaking this process is 
required to determine how well the mall security program is implemented.72  To 
say that staffing is adequate based on intuition without hard data is not a rational 
process.  Rational in this sense is aimed at measuring aspects of the mall’s 
business process to determining whether management acted reasonably.73  It is 
important to have at least one full year’s worth of data in order to account for 
seasonal fluctuations or other random anomalies that might occur (e.g., spike 
or sudden decrease in calls for service).74  A better data set is three to five years 
that also accounts for personnel trends such as fluctuations in staffing levels or 
significant emergencies that may adversely impact how calls for service are 
handled including the amount of time required to handle individual calls.75  A 
larger data set is also crucial to ensure a sufficient number of calls can be 
examined for their regularity (frequency and location) and similarity (type and 
 
69. See infra Table 2 and accompanying text.   
70. HALE, supra note 67, at 163.  Other staffing methods such as the per capita, minimum 
staffing and the authorized level approaches exist, but all are severely limited and do not account for 
workload volume.  The workload approach is much more comprehensive in determining appropriate 
staffing levels and is endorsed by the Commission for the Accreditation for Law Enforcement 
Agencies.  COMM’N, supra note 60, at 16-2; see ERIC J. FRITSCH ET AL., POLICE PATROL ALLOCATION 
AND DEPLOYMENT 32–45 (2009) (describing “early” and “modern” police allocation strategies); see 
also JEREMY M. WILSON & ALEXANDER WEISS, A PERFORMANCE-BASED APPROACH TO POLICE 
STAFFING AND ALLOCATION 21–50 (2012), http://a-
capp.msu.edu/sites/default/files/files/041218461_Performance_Based_Approach_Police_Staffing_FI
NAL100112.pdf [https://perma.cc/M88C-6Y76] (last visited Sept. 14, 2016).   
71. WILSON & WEISS, supra note 70, at 36.   
72. It is possible that workload data may be manipulated to show lesser need for security.  
However, mall management needs this data to self-monitor and it is not likely that workload data will 
be falsified.   
73. SECURITY SUPERVISION & MANAGEMENT 428 (Sandi J. Davies & Christopher A. Hertig 
eds., 3d ed. 2008) (documenting calls for service as “factual evidence of what is transpiring at the 
site . . . as opposed to what people ‘think’ is happening”).  See generally PETER M. BLAU & RICHARD 
A. SCHOENHERR, THE STRUCTURE OF ORGANIZATIONS (1971); JAMES D. THOMPSON, 
ORGANIZATIONS IN ACTION (1967).   
74. Shane, supra note 29, at 15.   
75. See id.  (“A better data set would encompass 2 years of information to clarify these same 
variables and also to illuminate personnel trends.”).   
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severity), which helps identify patterns and trends for planning purposes76 and 
may explain how offenders find suitable targets.77   
The workload analysis begins with defining the principle modalities (Table 
2)78 and must include: (1) type of call; (2) average number of hours spent 
handling the call;79 (3) number of calls of each type; (4) number of personnel 
required to handle the call; and (5) total employee hours per modality (Table 
3).80  The hours per unit is the average amount of time spent handling a single 
call for service of that type (e.g., handling a single assault will take 1 hour).81  
The units per year is the total number of calls for service for that type (e.g., 
there were twenty-five assaults for the year).82  The officers required is the 
number of officers assigned to handle each call.83  The total employee hours per 
modality is the product of hours per unit × units per year × officers required.84  
This presents the baseline volume of service demands and hours that security 
personnel will encounter as a matter of reactive work.85  This type of data is 
routinely captured by mall security either through pen and paper records, or 
electronically through computer-aided dispatch calls for service.86   
Although Table 2 is based on a yearly workload, this information can be 
retrieved by the month, week, or day in the calendar year.   
 
76. Id.  Calls for service data—which include date, time, location, duration, and nature—will put 
mall management on notice about people, places, and things that are prone to victimization.  Premises 
liability litigation may focus on a specific location within the property (such as a particular area of the 
parking lot, or a common area inside the mall) and may allege inadequate security based on a design 
flaw, a mechanical defect in a security device, or inadequate security staffing, which is why date, time, 
location, duration, and nature are vitally important variables to capture; these data alert mall 
management to emerging problems.  Calls for service may also fluctuate based on temporal distribution 
such as time of day, day of week, month of year and season (e.g., Christmas or holiday shopping).  See 
HALE, supra note 12, at 231.  In general, private security will often know about specific incidents and 
the wider patterns that develop from those incidents that occur on their property before the public 
police.  This is why it behooves mall management to frequently analyze workload data and to adjust 
existing personnel as necessary or hire additional personnel.  See MCNALLY, supra note 2, at 36.   
77. See generally Patricia L. Brantingham & Paul J. Brantingham, Environment, Routine, and 
Situation: Toward a Pattern Theory of Crime, in 5 ROUTINE ACTIVITY AND RATIONAL CHOICE: 
ADVANCES IN CRIMINOLOGICAL THEORY (Ronald V. Clarke & Marcus Felson eds., 1993).   
78. “Modalities” are the attributes (i.e., major activities) that are being examined.  In this 
example, the attributes are the types of calls for service mall security is likely to handle.   
79. Any portion of an hour is calculated as such.  For example, 20 minutes is captured as .33 
hours; 47 minutes is captured as .783 hours.   
80. Shane, supra note 29, at 15–16.   
81. Id. at 16.   
82. Id.   
83. Id.   
84. Id.   
85. Id.   
86. Id. at 15.   
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Distributing Officers’ Time Across Management Categories.  After the 
baseline calculations are determined for the reactive workload it is necessary to 
distribute the time across three primary categories: (1) service demands; (2) 
administrative activities; and (3) proactive activities87 (Table 3).  The first 
category (service demands) is critical since the other categories receive their 
allotted time based on what is allotted in this category.  The first priority for 
mall security is to answer calls for service from patrons and tenants.88  The sum 
of employee hours per modality represents 100% of the reactive workload 
(8,097 hours in this simulation, Table 1).89  However, there are other activities 
security personnel must do besides respond to calls for service, such as 
administrative tasks (e.g., submitting reports, attending meetings, meeting with 
supervisors) and proactive activities.90  It is not realistic to formulate a staffing 
model around 100% of the total employee hours per modality without 
accounting for a security officer’s other responsibilities.  This is where 
decisions about corporate priorities must be made regarding how much of the 
officers’ time mall management is willing to distribute across these three 
categories.  Administrative time and proactive time are discretionary but must 
be derived from a rational process.  Administrative time allocation (e.g., 
meeting with supervisors, submitting reports, attending meetings) should be 
based on meeting or supervisor logs.   
Proactive time is the most important discretionary area of mall management 
decision-making.  It includes decisions as to how many stationary guards 
should be assigned at fixed places (entrances, exits, bridges); how many CCTV 
cameras should be installed and the number of personnel to monitor them; and 
the number of roving patrol cars or foot patrol persons to be assigned.91  These 
decisions are informed in part by the reactive workload that provides 
information as to potential areas where trouble may be expected.92  However, 
deterrence is integral to effective policing and visible security is as important 
to mall security as it is to policing in municipalities, highways, and other public 
 
87. Id. at 17.  Proactive activities consist of self-initiated work (e.g., stop & question, traffic 
stops, parking enforcement, meeting with business owners, assisting patrons, surveillance) aimed at 
deterring crime and disorder through a visible show of security presence and engaging patrons to learn 
their concerns, thereby preventing crime from occurring.  See id.  This is contrasted against reactive 
activities such as responding to calls for service after something has occurred.  Id.   
88. See id.   
89. Id.   
90. Id.   
91. See id.   
92. See id. at 16.   
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areas.93  Proactive patrol is also used for observing suspicious circumstances, 
disrupting emerging disorder conditions (congregating juveniles), assisting 
patrons, addressing traffic conditions, and checking vulnerable locations (e.g., 
places where non-violent crime such as burglary, theft, and vandalism may 
occur).94  Consumer attitudes toward safety should also be taken into account.95  
The fact that this is a discretionary area of decision-making does not mean that 
it is without rigor.  Just as police document their decisions as to the deployment 
of resources, mall security mangers must be able to explain the processes they 
utilized for deciding both the number of security personnel and their 
deployment.   
In the following simulation, to handle 23,135 hours of work, where 35% of 
time is allocated to service demands, 10% is allocated for administrative 
activities, and 55% is allocated to proactive activities, the effective strength is 
eleven security officers (Table 3).96   
 
TABLE 3: DISTRIBUTION OF TIME 
Activity % Hours/year 
Service Demands 35.00% 8,097 
Administrative 10.00% 2,314 
Proactive 55.00% 12,724 
Total 100.00% 23,135 
Scheduled Hours  2,086 
Effective Strength   11.09 
 
The relief factor (Table 4), also known as nonproductive FTE, accounts for 
officers’ time off for various reasons (e.g., vacation, bereavement leave, 
personal day off, sick leave, training) and is used as a multiplier to determine 
coverage needs.  Once the relief factor is calculated, the actual personnel 
strength can be calculated, which is the actual number of security personnel 
required to handle the workload based on the distribution of time.  To provide 
 
93. See Romano, supra note 3, at 46–47; see also Marcus Felson, Those Who Discourage Crime, 
in 4 CRIME AND PLACE: CRIME PREVENTION STUDIES 62 (John E. Eck & David Weisburd eds., 1995).   
94. See generally Romano, supra note 3.   
95. The International Council of Shopping Centers (ICSC) conducts an annual customer survey 
on behalf of shopping centers to document consumers’ preferences, perceptions, and satisfaction, 
including security features, so that mall tenants and security directors can adjust their practices.  
Telephone Interview with Malachy Kavanagh, Senior Vice President, ICSC (Feb. 10, 2017).   
96. By way of example using this same data, if service demands are allocated at 65%, 
administrative activities at 10%, and proactive activities at 25%, total hours of work is reduced to 
12,457 (-46.1% reduction) with an effective strength of six security personnel instead of eleven.   
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adequate coverage, 1.34 security officers are required for every position subject 
to relief (Table 4).   
 
TABLE 4: NONPRODUCTIVE FTE (RELIEF FACTOR) 
 Time Off in Hours 
Time Off Security Officer 
Vacation 200 
Compensatory 40 
Sick Leave 120 
Personal 24 
Training 64 
Bereavement 80 
Total Time Off 528 
Work Year Personnel 2,086 
Availability 1,558 
Relief Factor 1.34 
 
Management and Support Staff Positions.  In addition to the workload 
analysis, other positions must be accounted for, including supervisors, 
management, support staff and fixed-posts to get the full picture of security 
staffing needs (Table 5).   
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Actual Staffing Strength.  In this simulation, 42 actual security officers are 
required to handle 23,135 hours of work that is spread across sixteen hours per 
day, seven days per week, for an entire year with an average attendance of 
56,844 visitors (Table 6).  Those personnel are supported by 6 supervisors, 3 
CCTV operators and 3 parking lot attendants for a total of 54 officers.  With 
55% of the security officers’ time devoted to proactive activities, visible 
presence is greatly heightened, which creates feelings of safety for patrons and 
promotes more opportunities for officers to observe and report suspicious 
circumstances, or engage with suspicious people.97   
 
97. Observing and reporting suspicious circumstances are part of the “See Something, Say 
Something” campaign of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security and the “Nationwide Suspicious 
Activity Reporting Initiative” of the U.S. Department of Homeland Security, the Federal Bureau of 
Investigation, and state, local, tribal, and territorial law enforcement partners.  U.S. DEPARTMENT OF 
HOMELAND SECURITY, If You See Something, Say Something, https://www.dhs.gov/see-something-
say-something [https://perma.cc/63HZ-7GZH] (last visited Jan. 28, 2018); NATIONWIDE SAR 
INITIATIVE, https://nsi.ncirc.gov/default.aspx [https://perma.cc/C6EW-HLF7] (last visited Jan. 28, 
2018); see also ROBERT C. DAVIS ET AL., AN ASSESSMENT OF THE PREPAREDNESS OF LARGE RETAIL 
MALLS TO PREVENT AND RESPOND TO TERRORIST ATTACK (2006).  In this study of mall preparedness, 
14.7% of mall security directors surveyed indicated that increasing the visibility of security officers 
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C. The Importance of Workload Analysis to Security Litigation 
In litigating a case where the issue is the adequacy of security, a workload 
analysis is a crucial component in deciding whether the mall management was 
negligent.  First, it sets a baseline for how many security officers should have 
been on duty to handle reactive calls based on past history.  A mall that is 
understaffed based on historical demands is presumably negligent.98  If the mall 
has a reduced security presence it must be able to explain why it has not 
provided adequate security to respond to expected calls for service.  Second, if 
the mall has not allocated resources for administrative personnel or for relief 
time, it will either be poorly managed or understaffed, or both.  Third, a 
workload analysis informs the mall management as to hot spots to which they 
 
was a measure that malls could take to become better prepared for a terrorist attack, id. at 10, and 63% 
of security directors said that the most frequent security change following the September 11, 2001, 
terrorist attacks was “to increase the visibility of security officers, instruct officers to be alert for 
suspicious individuals, and pay more attention to cars and delivery trucks coming into the mall.”  Id. 
at 18; see id. at 19 (illustrating the survey results).  The study suggests that mall directors do focus on 
visible patrols to deter crime and terror attacks.  See id. at 27–28, 30.   
98. See, e.g., L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W.3d 247 (Mo. 2002) (en banc); 
Foster v. Winston-Salem Joint Venture, 281 S.E.2d 36, 40 (N.C. 1981).   
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should deploy security officers.  Fourth, and most important, no policy or 
security force can operate effectively without personnel devoted to a pro-active 
presence to act as a deterrent against crime.  If all that a mall covers is reactive 
calls for service, it has not provided for roaming patrol cars, stationary officers 
at fixed points in the mall, officers to monitor ingress and egress, or officers to 
monitor surveillance cameras.  We do not suggest that a workload analysis will 
provide a definite answer as to the adequacy of security, but by setting forth a 
baseline tied to calls for service it provides a firm starting point to begin the 
analysis.  Mall operators must then be able to defend how they account for 
administrative needs and proactive policing.   
Earlier we noted that foreseeability of crime has been the most important 
factor relied on by the courts to establish a duty to provide security to protect 
against third-party crime or the breach of that duty.99   Having set forth the need 
for workload data to determine adequate staffing, we conclude that courts 
simply have it wrong.  The presence or absence of crime is reflected in calls for 
service that in turn sets the basis for adequate security.  When courts turn to 
foreseeability to account for possible crime because a mall is located in a high-
crime area, the premise is that crime in malls is more likely to occur because of 
the proximity of criminals to the mall,100  but that premise fails to take into 
account that malls may be structured in a manner to discourage third-party 
crime.  An entire science devoted to building malls and other structures to 
minimize crime belies the emphasis on the location of malls as an important 
determinant of the frequency of crime.101   Crime statistics of the surrounding 
 
99. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.   
100. See, e.g., Burris v. Eddie’s Liquor Store, No. B153671, 2002 WL 31521538 (Cal. Ct. App. 
Nov. 14, 2002); McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P’ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 904 (Tenn. 1996); Sharon P. 
v. Arman, Ltd., 989 P.2d 121, 123–24 (Cal. 1999); Trammell Crow Cent. Tex., Ltd. v. Gutierrez, 267 
S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. 2008); Young v. Prizm Asset Mgmt. Co., 100 A.3d 594, 600 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2014); 
Mellon Mortg. Co. v. Holder, 5 S.W.3d 654, 657 (Tex. 1999); Seibert v. Vic Regnier Builders, Inc., 
856 P.2d 1332, 1339 (Kan. 1993); Holland v. Liedel, 494 N.W.2d 772, 775 (Mich. Ct. App. 1992).   
101. See generally Patricia L. Brantingham & Paul J. Brantingham, Notes on the Geometry of 
Crime, in ENVIRONMENTAL CRIMINOLOGY (Paul J. Brantingham & Patricia L. Brantingham eds., 
1981).  Environmental criminology is the study of crime, criminality, and victimization as each relates 
to specific places and the way people and places shape activities in time and space to create or 
discourage opportunities.  See id. at 27–54; see also Patricia Brantingham & Paul Brantingham, 
Criminality of Place: Crime Generators and Crime Attractors, 3 EUR. J. ON CRIM. POL’Y & RES. 5–8 
(1995); Felson, supra note 93; Richard Wortley & Lorraine Mazerolle, Environmental Criminology 
and Crime Analysis: Situating the Theory, Analytic Approach and Application, in ENVIRONMENTAL 
CRIMINOLOGY AND CRIME ANALYSIS 1–3 (Richard Wortley & Lorraine Mazerolle eds., 2008).  
Environmental criminology has its roots in urban planning and crime prevention; the theory suggests 
that the physical environment, particularly its physical characteristics, building layout, and site plan 
function to allow people to become key agents of security to defend the space.  See generally OSCAR 
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area do not necessarily imply that a crime is foreseeable on the shopping 
center’s grounds.  To accept this as a viable method of forecasting crime at the 
shopping center is to deny virtually all of the environmental crime prevention 
literature.  Crime prevention through environment design, the concept of 
defensible space and situational crime prevention exist so that facilities can be 
made safer despite crime in surrounding areas.102   This is why facilities that are 
designed with crime prevention in mind can be placed into risky neighborhoods 
with reasonable assurance that crimes occurring outside the facility will not 
necessarily occur inside the facility or on the facility’s grounds.103  It is an 
either/or proposition.  If over a significant period of time calls for service do 
not reflect crime, then staffing may be adequate; if it does not then the great 
likelihood is that the mall was constructed environmentally to discourage 
crime.104 
V. SHIFTING THE BURDEN OF PROOF IN MALL SECURITY CASES TO THE 
DEFENDANT 
In an earlier section, we set forth the argument that in the context of data-
driven standards for reasonable staffing, the failure to meet that standard is good 
reason to shift the burden of proof to the defendant.105  Now that we have set 
forth the model for deciding adequate staffing we need to revisit the argument.  
In some cases, it is clear that the negligence of the mall to provide adequate 
staffing will not be the cause of the plaintiff’s harm.  If a patron of the mall 
utilizes a hidden handgun to randomly shoot ten people in a minute’s time it is 
likely that plaintiff will not be able to establish but-for causation or proximate 
 
NEWMAN, DEFENSIBLE SPACE: PEOPLE AND DESIGN IN THE VIOLENT CITY (1972); Douglas D. 
Perkins et al., The Physical Environment of Street Crime: Defensible Space, Territoriality and 
Incivilities, 13 J. ENVTL. PSYCHOL. 29 (1993).  An integral part of environmental criminology is crime 
prevention through environmental design (CPTED), which emphasizes a collection of design 
principles for the “built” environment, both indoors and outdoors.  C. RAY JEFFERY, CRIME 
PREVENTION THROUGH ENVIRONMENTAL DESIGN 224 (1977); MCNALLY, supra note 2, at 1, 3;  
Corey L. Gordon & William Brill, The Expanding Role of Crime Prevention Through Environmental 
Design in Premises Liability, NAT’L INST. JUST. (1996) (discussing the evolution of the legal basis for 
premises liability cases and their connection to CPTED features).  These principles encourage users of 
the physical environment to feel safe in their surroundings while concurrently discouraging motivated 
offenders from engaging in crime and anti-social behavior.  See Hunter, supra note 61, at 55–57; 
Romano, supra note 3, at 46–51.   
102. See Perkins, supra note 101, at 30.   
103. Id.; Gordon & Brill, supra note 101, at 6; MCNALLY, supra note 2, at 1.   
104. See Perkins, supra note 101, at 30–31.   
105. See supra notes 34–46 and accompanying text.   
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cause.106  There is no necessity in such a case to shift the burden of proof.  
Plaintiff will simply not be able to establish a prima facie case.   
The more difficult cases for causation arise from mugging, carjacking, 
kidnapping and various forms of sexual assault.  One has sympathy for courts 
that have struggled with the causation issue and their willingness to grant the 
defendants summary judgment or directed verdicts.107  After all, how are we to 
know that additional guards would have made a difference?  As the California 
Court of Appeal said in Nola M. v. University of Southern California in 
discussing the causation issue, “[W]here do we draw the line?  How many 
guards are enough?  Ten?  Twenty?  Two Hundred?”108  Lying beneath the 
surface is the frustration courts have in determining the standard for adequate 
security.  If the standard of care rests on shaky foundations based almost 
entirely on an unquantifiable foreseeability analysis and intuitive expert 
opinion, it is understandable that courts would be reluctant to allow a plaintiff 
to make a case based on both questionable negligence and equally questionable 
causation.109   
However, if the plaintiff can establish that mall security was inadequate 
based on calls for service data, then placing the burden of proof of causation on 
defendants is fair.  A jury can determine with some confidence how much 
security was necessary.  The defendant should justly bear the burden of proving 
that had that level of security been in place, the injury to the plaintiff would 
have taken place in any event.  The argument in favor of switching the burden 
of proof on causation to the defendant in cases where the plaintiff proves breach 
of the duty to provide adequate security was propounded by an intermediate 
court of appeals in Saelzler v. Advanced Group 400.110  On appeal, the 
California Supreme Court rejected this position and found that the plaintiff had 
not proved causation by a preponderance of the evidence.111  In finding the lack 
of causation as a matter of law, the court relied on a line of cases that insisted 
 
106. See, e.g., Lopez v. McDonald’s, 238 Cal. Rptr. 436 (Cal. Ct. App. 1987).   
107. See cases cited supra note 41. 
108. 20 Cal. Rptr. 2d 97, 108 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993).   
109. See Wright v. R.M. Smith Invs., L.P., 15-CA-00199-COA (¶¶8, 9, 11) (Miss. Ct. App. 
2016) (explaining the relationship between the strength of the violation and the standard of care and 
cause-in-fact).  In Williams v. Utica College of Syracuse University, Judge Calabresi found that a 
standard of care that just passes the threshold to avoid summary judgment will require more demanding 
proof for cause-in-fact.  453 F.3d 112, 121 (2d Cir. 2006).   
110. 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 103, 112 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999).  For a lengthy article supporting this position 
see Dennis T. Yokoyama, The Law of Causation in Actions Involving Third-Party Assaults When the 
Landowner Negligently Fails to Hire Security Guards: A Critical Examination of Saelzler v. Advanced 
Group 400, 40 CAL.W. L. REV. 79 (2003).   
111. Saelzler v. Advanced Grp. 400, 23 P.3d 1143, 1155 (Cal. 2001).   
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that in security cases plaintiff must provide sufficient evidence to make out 
cause-in-fact.112  In our view, the reason why the court has taken a strong 
position on the causation issue is clear.  Where the standards for establishing 
how much security would be reasonable security are tenuous, the courts will 
not allow a burden shift to the defendants.113  Those who advocate a burden 
shift to the defendants are willing to do so based on a simple breach of the 
standard of care, i.e., there should have been more security guards.114  Since 
they cannot quantify how many, they invite the courts to take the position that 
they will not speculate on causation and thus deny recovery by refusing to let 
the case go to juries.115   
VI. CONCLUSION 
The case law dealing with the liability of malls for third-party crime 
committed on their premises has focused almost exclusively on the 
foreseeability that crime may occur.116  The number of crimes that have 
occurred in the past determine whether there is a duty or the breach of the 
standard of care.117  Courts cannot agree as to the number or the severity of the 
crimes necessary to trigger a duty of care or the breach.118  Experts for the 
opposing parties regularly opine as to whether the staffing was adequate and 
whether adequate staffing would have averted the crime to the plaintiff.119 
This Article challenges the existing case law on two grounds.  First, 
adequate staffing of a mall cannot be determined by looking merely at past 
criminal conduct.  To determine adequate or reasonable staffing, it is absolutely 
necessary to examine workload data to determine calls for service at the mall.  
Second, the opinions of experts who opine as to adequate staffing without 
undertaking a workload analysis are simply unprofessional.  A workload 
analysis is fundamental to all policing and is so recognized by the agency that 
accredits police forces.  Once a workload analysis is performed that identifies 
the reactive work of the mall security force, it is necessary for the mall 
management to decide the nature and the amount of proactive resources that it 
 
112. Id. at 1149–51.   
113. See id. at 1151–55.   
114. See id. at 1154–55.   
115. See id.   
116. See, e.g., L.A.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W. 3d 247, 258 (Mo. 2002) (en 
banc); Dickinson Arms-REO, L.P. v. Campbell, 4 S.W.3d 333, 345–46 (Tex. App. 1999); Ann M. v. 
Pac. Plaza Shopping Ctr., 863 P.2d 207 (Cal. 1993).   
117. See Liller v. Quick Stop Food Mart, Inc., 507 S.E.2d 602, 605 (N.C. Ct. App. 1998).   
118. See McClung v. Delta Square Ltd. P’ship, 937 S.W.2d 891, 899 (Tenn. 1996).   
119. See Wright v. R.M. Smith Invs., L.P., 15-CA-00199-COA (¶¶8, 9, 11) (Miss. Ct. App. 
2016); Noble v. L.A. Dodgers, Inc., 214 Cal. Rptr. 395, 398 (Cal. Ct. App. 1985).   
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needs to deploy for adequate security.  Mall safety is too important to leave to 
the untutored opinion of experts who have not done their basic homework.  It 
is high time that the science of policing be reflected in the judicial decisions 
that decide cases based on mall injuries resulting from third-party crime.   
Once the standard for adequate or reasonable policing of malls is 
established, courts should shift the burden of proof to the defendant that the 
lack of adequate policing was not causal.  Plaintiff cannot prove by a 
preponderance of the evidence that additional security would have prevented a 
particular crime.  If courts allow the causation question to go juries based on 
expert testimony by plaintiffs that additional security would have prevented a 
crime, they make a mockery of the causation issue.  Plaintiffs cannot reasonably 
carry their burden of proof.  It may be difficult for defendants to prove that 
additional security would not have made a difference, but if an error is to be 
made it should be made against the defendants who failed, based on objective 
criteria, to provide adequate security.   
 
